We argue that openness to foreign investment can have differential effects on corruption, even within the same country and under the exact same domestic institutions over time. Our theoretical approach departs from standard political economy by attributing corruption motives to firms as well as officials. Rather than interpreting bribes solely as a coercive "tax" imposed on business activities, we allow for the possibility that firms may be complicit in using bribes to enter protected sectors. Thus, we expect variation in bribe propensity across sectors according to expected profitability which we proxy with investment restrictions. Specifically, we argue that foreign investment will not be associated with corruption in sectors with fewer restrictions and more competition, but will increase dramatically as firms seek to enter restricted and uncompetitive sectors that offer higher rents. We test this effect using a list experiment, a technique drawn from applied psychology, embedded in a nationally representative survey of 10,000 foreign and domestic businesses in Vietnam. Our findings show that the impact of domestic reforms and economic openness on corruption is conditional on polices that restrict competition by limiting entry into the sector.
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The increasing economic and political importance of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the global economy generally, and in emerging markets in particular, has inspired a great deal of academic work devoted to uncovering the economic and political consequences of these flows. A recent branch of this work has focused on assessing the impact of economic openness on corrupt behavior by government officials. The dominant perspective in the literature suggests that opening a country to FDI or trade flows should reduce corruption through two different, but not mutually exclusive channels (Sandholtz and Gray 2003) : 1) increased competition brought by multi-national corporations (MNCs) lowers monopoly rents and drives down bribe schedules (Rose-Ackerman 1978 Ades and Di Tella 1998 , Larrain and Tavares 2004 , Bohara et al. 2003 ; or 2) the introduction of non-corrupt, Western business practices diffuse to domestic businesses in emerging markets (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000 , 40, Gerring and Thacker 2005 , Kwok and Tadesse 2006 .
We contest these findings on both empirical and theoretical grounds. Empirically, the observed correlations between FDI and corruption in the above studies could result from severe errors of measurement, aggregation, and, in many cases, endogeneity bias. More importantly, the extant literature, which predominantly employs cross-national data, has yet to definitively establish the causal logic of the firm-level behavior their theories depend upon. There is little systematic, firm-level evidence of firms responding to competition by limiting bribery or of domestic firms adopting Western modes of corporate governance. Although a large number of studies have observed the same negative correlations between FDI and corruption in cross-national datasets, others offer an alternative theoretical interpretation -foreign investors are attracted to less corrupt business environments (Lambsdorff 1999 , Mauro 1995 , Wei 2000 , Smarynska and Wei 2000 , Wei and Wu 2002 Gatti 2004 ).
Moreover, work that does employ firm-level data concludes that foreign investors can also exacerbate corruption in host countries, by using bribes to substitute for the local business acumen and dense social networks of their domestic competitors (Hellman et al. 2002 , Soreide's 2006 , Tanzi and Davoodi 1997 , especially in countries with weak institutions (Pinto and Zhu 2008) .
In this paper, we narrow our analytical lens on an individual firm's decision to bribe, arguing that bribery is strongly determined by the expected profitability (or rents) in the sector a business wishes to enter. Although rent size is a function of multiple factors, including market structure and access to vital resources, we focus on the role of national policies and investment regulations, as they have more generalizable implications. 1 Shleifer and Vishny (1993) have shown that politicians use such regulations to enrich themselves by offering relief from them in exchange for bribes. In the case of entry regulations, as we argue below, the restrictions on competition also serve to generate larger rents for firms lucky enough to be granted a license, increasing their motivation for bribery. Thus, we expect variation in bribe propensity across sectors. In sectors, where restrictions generate high rents, bribery has the greatest expected benefit and we should observe higher rates of corruption.
Likewise, when domestic policies or international agreements remove restrictions that are associated with rents, we should anticipate a concomitant reduction in corruption in those newly liberalized sectors. Consequently, international integration may indeed reduce corruption, but at least a portion of the reduction actually precedes the entrance of new FDI into the domestic economy. And, as we argue in more detail below, reductions in corruption should be concentrated in sectors that are actually exposed to greater international competition.
Our emphasis on the relationship between corruption and entry restrictions builds on a literature that has, thus far, focused on how variation in levels of corruption can be explained by market competition (Krueger 1974, Ades and Di Tella 1999) , how competition affects the functional character of corruption (Myrdal 1968 , Lui 1985 , Ross 2001 , and most directly how protectionist policies can increase the incidence of corruption (Dutt 2007 (Dutt , 2009 Broadman and Recanatini 2002) . In these scenarios, the availability of rents is determined by access to highly profitable industries. However, profits in these industries, such as mining and extraction, do not vary much, absent fluctuations in global prices. Consequently, empirical analyses have been limited to formal modals (Bliss and Di Tella 1997) .
We address this limitation in two ways. First, we conceptualize corruption as a two-way interaction between firms and host-country government agents. Rather than viewing bribes solely as an additional "tax" imposed on businesses engaging in activities such as obtaining business licenses, moving goods through ports, or passing regular (or irregular) business inspections (Wei 2000) , we allow for the possibility that foreign firms may be complicit in using bribes to gain access to rents existing in the protected domestic sectors. We believe this is a more realistic model that better captures the nuances of business corruption.
Second, rather than relying on aggregate national data, we test our theory in an original, firm-level survey experiment conducted in Vietnam, where our dependent variables are designed to measure, as accurately as possible, the level of 4 corruption experienced by an individual firm when registering its business and entering the host country's market. We use an empirical strategy, drawn from research in experimental psychology, to test the linkage between openness and corruption hypothesized above. Instead of using traditional techniques for shielding respondents from admitting culpability in corrupt actions that are artificial and tend to inflate the estimates of corrupt behavior, we employ a specialized survey experiment (known as the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) or list question) in surveys of 7,300 domestic, private enterprises (DPEs) and 1,155 MNCs conducted during the Summer of 2010. UCTs take advantage of basic rules of probability to extract sensitive information from responses to two different versions of a survey question collected from randomly selected sample pairs. The technique has been shown to provide the most accurate and confidential assessments of sensitive activity in repeated testing (Couts and Jann 2009).
These survey experiments were embedded in the most comprehensive annual assessment of the business environment Next, we test the impact of international integration, by taking advantage of two sources of variation in economic openness. First, we compare the individual behavior of domestic and foreign invested enterprises between 1990 and 2010 across both restricted and unrestricted sectors. Second, we study how corruption among foreign and domestic enterprises was influenced by the incremental lifting of restrictions on foreign investment entry. Vietnam provides a particularly useful test case, because the 1996 Foreign Investment Law and its subsequent iterations contained a provision requiring special licensing procedures for projects in sectors that were deemed to be vital to national security or of strategic economic interest (known as "Group A" projects), which can be measured at the International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) four-digit level.
The generous interpretation by Vietnamese leaders of 'strategic interest' allows for tremendous cross-sectional and longitudinal variation, which we exploit in our empirical analysis.
Focusing on the removal of Group A investment restrictions rather than other metrics of economic integration, such as exposure to trade and FDI, helps reduce the threat of reverse causality in our statistical analysis, as we can simply study whether a sector was restricted or unrestricted at the time an investor chose to enter the Vietnamese market. Although alternative measures gauge the magnitude of international exposure, they are highly prone to reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, large shares of FDI may have resulted from earlier and unrelated reductions in corruption.
Furthermore, most countries do not move from pure autarky to free capital mobility overnight. Usually they liberalize incrementally, over time and based on domestic political and economic calculations. Scholars measuring openness in terms of aggregate FDI flows are forced to overlook this pattern. Because our theory is based on firm and sector-level variation in rents, we test for the possibility that levels of corruption vary, even within the same country and under the exact same domestic institutions over time. Measuring the investment restrictions at the ISIC four-digit level allows us to capture this variation. Of course, restrictions themselves can result from endogenous regulation demanded by entrenched interests and first-movers (Rajan and Zingales 2003) -an issue that we address directly in Section 4. Nevertheless, focusing on administrative restrictions as opposed to alternative measures of openness gets us much closer to the theoretical question we are trying to tackle: i.e. do policy-induced barriers affect corruption? This is a question of direct policy relevance to governments struggling with corruption.
Anticipating our results, we find that over the period of investigation, Group A projects were far more lucrative than projects in non-restricted industries. After addressing endogeneity bias, in a given year, restricted sectors average 8.6% greater industrial concentration and 1.2% higher profit margins, meaning that entering a restricted sector assures extraordinary market power and economic rents,. Further, we find that 22.9% of operations in Vietnam paid bribes during the registration period. 2 While foreign firms are no more likely than domestic firms to bribe overall, MNCs attempting to enter restricted sectors have a 31% predicted probability of engaging in bribery, 14% higher than their domestic competitors in restricted sectors and 19% more likely to bribe than foreign firms in non-restricted sectors.
2 A similar exercise for public procurement reveals that 34.7% of all operations paid bribes when seeking to acquire government contracts. Once again, foreign firms were less likely in general to bribe during procurement (11% versus 39%), but the difference is once again not statistically significant. The finding that bribing is more common during procurement than during registration is not surprising. Government contracts are extremely lucrative and rational investors may be willing to expend extra investment if they know procurement officers are willing. While corruption in procurement deals is undoubtedly endorsed and sustained by the politician, the firm is most likely an active and voluntary participant. Due to space considerations, we focus on business entry, leaving procurement for a separate analysis.
The International Political Economy (IPE) of Corruption
The prevailing prediction in the IPE literature is that opening a country to FDI or trade flows should reduce corruption by lowering monopoly rents and bribe schedules (Rose-Ackerman 1978 , Larrain and Tavares 2004 , Sandholtz and Gray 2003 , Bohara et al. 2004 . Treisman (2000) finds this relationship between corruption and openness (measured by imports/GDP), but concludes that the effect is substantively small. Dutt (2007) comes to a similar conclusion but goes a step further by using instrumental variables for trade policy rather than trade volumes. Although less prominent, some scholars have disputed the notion that openness reduces corruption, arguing that FIEs can actually augment corruption in some environments (Manzetti and Blake 1996) . Interestingly, this set of scholars is more likely to rely on firm-level surveys rather than cross-national data. Hellman et al. (2002) , using survey data drawn from transition economies, find that foreign firms are just as likely to engage in corruption as their domestic counterparts, and significantly more likely to engage in corruption in economies where the policy making process had been captured by large, domestic operations. Their findings were confirmed by Soreide's (2006) study of Norwegian FIE transactions in transitional economies. Hellman et al. (2002) conclude that foreign firms face a disadvantage when competing with domestic firms, because they lack the dense local social networks and local business acumen available to their native counterparts. Moreover, these operations are "sitting ducks for rapacious politicians to extract rents (13)" because their exit opportunities are more constrained. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) go further, arguing that FIEs face higher incentives to bribe, because relatively small 7 transactions from their perspective have a sizable impact on the living standards of local officials, and therefore can be more persuasive. The effects of home country legal institutions, such as the FCPA, do not fare well in these analyses, as the survey evidence indicates that FIEs have found innumerable ways to avoid these restrictions (Moran 2006) . Indeed, Wei (2000) and Hellman et al. (2002) find no evidence at all that foreign investors from home countries with such legal institutions behave differently than their unconstrained foreign and domestic counterparts.
A nuanced set of arguments offer conditional theories for the relationship between openness and corruption. Baksi et al. (2009) argue that global integration will increase corruption in the short term by offering a larger set of targets from which corrupt agents can exact bribes. But as a particular host county attracts more FDI, corruption becomes more visible to the international community, which will eventually pressure those agents to reduce their rent-seeking activities. Pinto and Zhu (2008) devise a second conditional theory, which builds on the survey findings of Hellman et al. (2002) to suggest that FDI reduces corruption in more democratic economies and with political institutions which encourage political participation and market competition. Blackburn and Gonzalo (2006) find that corruption is exacerbated by protection, but that liberalization may not help once corruption is entrenched. Similarly, Tavares (2005) finds that countries that liberalize, but do not democratize, experience an increase in corruption.
International Trade and Investment Arrangements
A separate IPE literature offers fascinating results regarding economic openness, but has worked tangentially to direct empirical work on corruption. These scholars find that bilateral trade agreements (BTAs), bilateral investment treaties (BITs), and accession to the World Trade Organization significantly increase FDI inflows. The argument is that such agreements can serve as credible signals of good governance and market economics or to tie the hands of governments from reneging on contracts with investors (Büthe and Milner 2008 , 2011 , Elkins et al 2006 , Kerner 2009 , Neumayer and Spress 2005 , Vandevelde 1998 , Tobin and Busch 2010 . Overall, much debate exists in the literature about whether trade and investment agreements improve the quality of domestic governance, or substitute for it and allow states with problematic institutions or high corruption to still attract investment (Vandevelde 1998 , Rosendorff 2010 . Alternatively, other scholars argue that such agreements only work in the presence of good institutions, and thus serve as a complement to high quality governance (Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005) .
Despite this intriguing theoretical backdrop, we have yet to see a systematic empirical assessment of the effects of trade and investment agreements on actual levels of corruption. This appears to be a substantial omission, since many agreements insist upon changes in the country's legal provisions, normative documents, and may, by extension, affect the opportunities for corruption. Most modern trade agreements-in particular US trade agreements and WTO and EU accession or treaties-entail extensive requirements that go far beyond the traditional objective of reducing barriers to trade, such as tariff rates and import quotas, often calling for developing countries or transition economies to modernize their legal and institutional frameworks. To bring rules, regulations, and administrative procedures more in line with international best practices requires a commitment to legislative and regulatory transparency, due process, arms-length regulation applied equally to all firms, administrative review and formal dispute settlement through arbitration and the courts (Crisp et al 2010) .
Regulatory reform through trade agreements is "top-down"; the national government negotiates with foreign countries to develop a trade treaty that is enacted into law for application throughout the economy. As an example, to meet its USBTA and WTO requirements, Vietnam revised or developed anew more than one hundred laws and regulations.
According to Steve Parker (2007), the head of the US-AID funded STAR project in Vietnam, which provided technical assistance to Vietnam on implementing its international commitments, trade agreements may actually have an independent effect on corruption outside of their direct effect of increased capital flows. "Effectively employed, the increasingly transparent and legal representation of commercial, regulatory and administrative rights and responsibilities benefits both domestic and foreign firms. It improves the business environment, strengthens the rule of law, and combats corruption (p10)."
Thus, we expect that implementation of regulatory reforms that are inspired by international agreements will reduce
corruption. An important feature of such domestic reforms, however, is that they are rarely applied universally to the entire economy (Crisp et al 2010) . Rather, deep negotiations take place over particular sectors and phase-in periods are allowed in sectors where reform is most difficult. The divergence in regulatory barriers creates wide differences in the level of economic rents across sectors. As Weeke et al. 2008 , put it in regard to the service sector, "Critical service sectors are often subject to the most stringent government regulations because of social and public policy concerns, typically restricting the role of foreign providers" (p7). Because of these regulatory protections, services (such as insurance provision, healthcare, and banking) create artificial monopolies and therefore provide the same types of opportunities for corruption as natural resource extraction and utilities, where true natural monopolies exist. Similar relationships exist in budding industries, such as has been the case in 9
Vietnam's aquaculture sector or in China's cinemas, both of which are vehemently restricted without any obvious social or political concerns at stake. Other sectors, particularly those in manufacturing and retail, typically operate with much smaller profit margins and much greater competition. 4 We are not the first to highlight how rents affect bribery. In the economics literature, excessively high profit-margins have been thought to indicate insufficient competition. High profit margins also indicate opportunities for venal bureaucrats and officials with authority over the respective economic activity to demand bribes and kickbacks (Ades and Di Tella 1999; Svensson 2003; Clark and Xu 2003) . This is especially true when the lack of competition is itself a consequence of state controls over an economic activity that deliberately raises costs to entry. Nevertheless, the attraction of high-profits in noncompetitive economic activities can incentivize newcomer investors to offer entry bribes. In short, bribing one's way into a high-margin sector is a two way street. Businesses are motivated to invest a little more to increase their chances of entry, and gate-keeper bureaucrats are in-turn motivated to demand bribes and keep access constrained (Shleifer and Vishny 1993). Ades and Di Tella (1999) attempt to test this relationship on a cross-national sample of countries and find that corruption is associated with high rents (which they operationalize indirectly as imports/GDP); where domestic firms are sheltered from foreign competition by natural or policy induced barriers to trade; and in economies dominated by a small number of large firms.
Testable Hypotheses
The above discussion reveals a clear conditional empirical prediction that we analyze below. Foreign firms make a strategic decision to bribe when entering a market, based on the rents available in that sector. Thus, when aggregating across all industries, we should not expect a significant difference in the amount of bribery between foreign and domestic firms.
Foreign firms faced with the prospect of paying a bribe in low-margin sector, such as garment manufacturing, will simply decide to produce in another country if the bribe price equals or exceeds the expected marginal profit. Moreover, bureaucrats serving as gatekeepers to business entry are savvy enough not to demand bribes in these sectors, for fear that they will end up being responsible for losing valuable FDI projects. In short, corruption taking the form of queue jumping ahead of the competition (Lui 1985) or endogenous harassment on the part of over-zealous bureaucrats (Myrdal 1968 ) is parameterized by the rents available in a particular sector. Rents, however, are themselves sensitive to the underlying market conditions of a region which are defined in no small part by trade patterns and are in-turn correlated with the overall patterns of foreign 4 See Kalinova et al (2010) for a comparison of FDI restrictions across countries.
investment. In order to short-circuit this circular relationship, we proxy for expected rents by focusing on entry restrictions that were in place at the time a given firm chose to enter the Vietnamese market.
Foreign firms attempting to enter restricted sectors which offer higher economic rents are far more likely to bribe when seeking a valuable investment entry license. In markets restricted by statute, ensuring economic rents by obtaining firstmover advantages, or queue jumping, is a very attractive for incoming investors (Lui 1985) . Ross (2001) calls this activity "rent creation," a process during which firms seek access to rents created by state policy. Likewise, gatekeeper bureaucrats evaluating licenses applications are equally aware of the value their approval holds for prospective entrepreneurs who cannot achieve similar rents by relocating to another country. Thus, we hypothesize that:
H1: The propensity of foreign firms to bribe increases with economic rents.
As countries sign investment arrangements as part of economic integration, restrictions to entry, and consequently the expected benefits of corruption, fall. We expect bribery rates to decrees as well.
H2: The removal of investment restrictions will: a) reduce economic rents in a sector. b) reduce the willingness of foreign firms to bribe.
The relationship between investment restrictions and domestic firms is more complicated. While restrictions on domestic entry will likely have the same effect, the impact of restrictions on foreign entry into strategic sectors is predominantly based on the existing economic competition in that sector. In most emerging markets, very few firms have the size and scale necessary to provide telecommunications, banking, or insurance services. As a result, existing theory suggests that the government does not need to limit domestic entry into these arenas. In these cases, foreign investment restrictions serve to protect these favored, domestic producers, and are likely un-related to the decisions of domestic firms to bribe upon entry (see Grossman and Helpman (1994) on protection rationale). Removing these restrictions, however, could threaten the position of domestic monopolists and therefore generate additional corruption in the domestic sector (Prez-Batres and Eden 2007). We address the domestic protection theory more rigorously below.
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Measurement Error and the Theoretical Relationship between FDI and Corruption
Contributors to the FDI-corruption literature come to the debate with strong theory and very poor data, which contributes to the confusing results. Each of the analysts surveyed above find empirical support for their arguments, whether pro, con, or conditional. The current approaches to studying openness and corruption faced by businesses are prone to four types of well-known biases: 1) normal perception biases of respondents in how they respond to Likert scales; 2) anchoring bias in the way corruption and bribes are understood (King et al. 2004 ); 3) biases caused by variation in respondents' confidence that the information they reveal will not be used to punish them ( None of these biases would be problematic for a research endeavor if they affected responses randomly, so that the measurement error simply created noise around the estimated effects. They would be problematic but not fatal if the bias was systematic, so that all respondents were influenced to over-estimate or under-estimate the level of corruption by the same amount. But these scenarios are unlikely. The core problem faced by researchers is that all of the current approaches used to analyze the relationship between openness (particularly FDI flows) and corruption are prone to the statistical problem known as "systematic and variable measurement error in the dependent variable." This type of measurement error causes severe problems for causal inference, because the measurement error in the dependent variable is correlated with the independent variable, which the analyst intends to evaluate. As a result, the researcher will identify a relationship between the outcome and an independent variable that is in fact simply an artifact of errors in the data collection exercise.
To put a finer point on this critique: variables, such as political institutions, socio-economic factors, and social capital, are likely to influence the level of bias in a respondent's answer (Treisman 2007 , Olken 2007 . Indeed, Treisman (2007) finds that perceived corruption is thought to be lower in countries with democratic institutions, media freedom, and high economic development, while it is perceived to be worse in poor countries, with more intrusive regulations, and less democratic protection. These factors explain 90% of the variation of cross-national indices in perceived corruption. Nevertheless, actual corruption, measured by the proportion of respondents self-reporting bribe payments is not associated with any of these political and economic factors (Treisman 2007) . Unfortunately, the factors that drive the measurement error in international indices of corruption will also be associated with the level of investment into and trade with a particular locality. As a result, the correlations between corruption and openness in the literature, especially the conditional correlations demonstrated in respect to institutional quality, may result from the relationship between openness and its correlation with the errors in measurement of corruption -not from the causal relationship identified by the authors. Without correcting this problem, we can never be sure of the true implications of greater openness.
In addition to measurement error, current approaches fall prey to errors of aggregation. Systematic and objective measures of corruption are hard to come by, forcing researchers to rely on perceptions data drawn from surveys or country- Or shouldn't corruption have diverse effects on different types of corrupt actions. For instance, competition may drive up the price of land, increasing land-related misadventures while reducing kick-backs on government contracts, which can now be purchased from overseas suppliers.
Similarly, the aggregation of FDI into annual flows or stocks combines capital from vastly different "sender" nations, sectors, and business legal types -each with widely varying inhibitions, incentives, and grounds for engaging corruptly. It is becoming more and more inappropriate to assume that FDI flows from the highly transparent and institutionalized Western economies, rather than other emerging markets, will have the same impact on corruption. It is equally inappropriate to assume that FDI comes simply in the form of new "green-field" foreign investment; indeed, most FDI comes in various shades, such as from private to public, from joint-venture to acquisition, and from restricted to unrestricted sectors. A convincing assessment of the relationship between FDI and corruption should explore variation in FDI and identify their relationship with specific form(s) of corruption. Even though testing on country-level data has the advantage of allowing variation on political institutions, it comes at great empirical cost because it is impossible to deal effectively with multiple unobserved factors (socio-cultural, historical, leadership) that may be simultaneously increasing economic integration and reducing corruption (Fisman and Miguel 2010).
In our empirical strategy below, we attempt to correct for measurement error in perceptions of corruption by measuring corruption experience directly with respect to both foreign and domestic firms in one socio-cultural setting but 13 across different entry environments. This approach allows us to offer the first unbiased assessment of the impact of economic openness on corruption. An additional feature of our strategy is to allow for the possibility that firms are culpable in the bribe activity, a dynamic that is captured by the objective measure of corruption we employ. Most importantly, our measures of corruption and liberalization facilitate direct longitudinal assessment that previous studies, due to data limitations, have been unable to produce.
FDI in Vietnam
Analysts This realization has led Vietnamese leaders to identify the problem of business-government corruption as a key target for reform. However, negligible progress in reducing business-government corruption has led some analysts to conclude that the problems are systemic and cannot be resolved with short-term policy fixes (Gainsborough 2009 ).
Restrictions on FDI Entry
Similar to other emerging markets, as a whole, market competiveness in Vietnam leaves much to be desired. Although over 30 different economic sectors were protected by restrictive conditions on foreign investment. In addition to the restrictions typical of any non-democratic economy, such as those of the press and national defense, Vietnamese restrictions also extended to finance sectors, retail distribution, and even some cash crops like sugar and tobacco. Although, the motivation for some of these restrictions was and continues to be ostensibly political, others may be strategically aimed at repelling foreign competition. Several sectors remain restricted throughout our period of observation, but Vietnam's 2007 WTO entry did result in the liberalization of a large number of these 'conditional' sectors (See Table 1 ).
( This is not to say that foreign capital did not find its way into sectors while they were restricted. Our data shows foreign entry into almost all restricted sectors over this time frame. Nevertheless, the additional restrictions served to dampen competition and generate high rents for those lucky enough to enter them. To demonstrate this point we gathered trienniallevel information on sectoral restrictions from revisions to Vietnam's Law on Foreign Investment and other legal documents related to foreign investment. Although restrictions exist within multiple dimensions ,which at times vary depending on location and license size, the most apparent is the blanket sector-level restriction which we code as a dichotomous variable during each three year period the sector was classified as a "Group A" restricted sector.
Analyzing the Impact of Restrictions on Market Concentration and Rents
To analyze the effect of these restrictions, we created a measure of competition and rents available at the ISIC four-digit While not perfectly correlated with HHI, the proportion of economic sectors subject to Group A investment restrictions has declined radically as well from about 36% of all four-digit sectors, observed in our sample, to 23% today. Although the correlations appear strong, there is reason to be suspicious that the apparent relationship could be spurious, caused by declines in both HHI and restrictions over time, or by omitted firm-level features driving both variables. We test the robustness of the relationship using HHI and the average profit-margin of firms (Profit/Revenue) at the ISIC four-digit level, another measure of rents, as our dependent variables and regress them on a dichotomous measure of whether a particular sector is listed as being Group A. These results are presented in Table 2 , where the unit of analysis is the sector (four-digit)-year, between 1996
and 2010 for all sectors operating in Vietnam during that time. Models 1 & 6 display the simple bivariate regressions and Models 2 & 7 add controls for the capital/labor ratio of the industry, allowing us to separate the impact of restrictions from the cost structure of the industry. Models 3 & 8 add year dummies to make sure that our results are not simply capturing over-time trending in both the dependent and independent variable. With year fixed effects, this model essentially provides the HHI observed by survey respondents in the year they chose to invest in a given sector in Vietnam.
The final models for each dependent variable (Models 4, 5, 9, & 10) address the possible threat that endogenous regulation poses to our analysis. There is a first-mover benefit to early investors, who may lobby for regulations to protect their market share (Rajan and Zingales 2003 , Benmelech and Moskowitz 2010 , Weymouth 2011 . According to this theory, MNCs may be complicit in establishing the regulatory framework, using corruption to influence host-country officials. If this is the case, the causal relationship could be reversed, meaning corruption might pre-date investment restrictions and available rents (Bandyopadhyay and Roy 2007) . Thankfully, the registry of Group A restrictions has only moved in one direction over time; restrictions have been removed and never added, limiting the threat that new restrictions emerged to protect early investors. Nevertheless, there remains a legitimate concern that the removal of restrictions and the length that restrictions are in place, especially those that result from international agreements, may have been negotiated with an eye to entry by particular MNCs.
To account for these concerns, we employ a two-stage instrumental variables model, where we instrument for restrictions by the share of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in the particular four-digit sector. 5 This variable is lagged one year to account for the state share at the time policy-makers were negotiating restrictions. SOE investment share picks up the legacy effect of
Vietnam's former command economy. As Vietnam is still transitioning from a centrally-planned system and has not undergone full-scale privatization, many sectors are still dominated by large, state-owned conglomerates. As we noted above, there is strong reason to suspect that Group A restrictions were aimed predominantly at protecting their market share (See The IV-strategy confirms this. Each 10% increase in SOE share, increases the probability of Group A restrictions by 2% in the first stage (Model 12). Moreover, the size of the coefficients on restrictions and the R 2 in both the HHI and profit models fall dramatically, indicating that our approach has removed a portion of the endogeneity bias. Finally, the CraggDonaldson F-Statistic is large and statistically significant, indicating that the strength of the identification in the first-stage model is sufficient to proceed with IV-2SLS. Thus, by instrumenting with SOE share, our estimates should be interpreted as the impact of regulations that are determined by the legacy of central planning, after the regulations possibly demanded by early MNC entrants have been removed.
<Table 2 About Here>
After ensuring exogenous regulation, accounting for market structure, and controlling for time effects in Models 5 and 10, we find that restricted sectors have a tremendous 8.7% greater industrial concentration and a 1.3% larger median profit margin. The less pronounced difference in profit margins likely results from the fact that removing restrictions simultaneously lowers the costs of firms in non-restricted sectors, leading to higher profits there as well. In short, exogenous barriers to investment have dramatic effects on a firm's expected profitably. An enterprise lucky enough to enter a restricted sector can be assured of extraordinary market power and economic rents. Given our theory, we expect that firms attempting to start Group A projects are far more likely to pay more for this privilege.
Foreign Direct Investors in the PCI Survey
The Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI) survey is a highly representative selection of 7,300 domestic firms and 1,155 FIEs which are located throughout country's 63 provinces, although many of the provinces have only one or two active FDI projects. The sample frame for selection was the list of registered domestic firms and FIEs in the General Tax Authority database of registered operations. Excluding businesses that had incorrect telephone numbers and addresses, and therefore could not be reached, the response rate was about 30% for domestic operations and 20% for FIEs. While these response rates are actually much higher than the rates commonly received in the international business literature (White and Luo 2006) , they are still large enough to create concerns about reliability (Dillman et al. 2002) . As a result, it is reasonable to ask whether non-response creates selection bias that might affect our conclusions. In Online Appendix 2, we compare the PCI data to available information from the General Statistical Office's Enterprise Census and Tax Authority Databases. The table shows that PCI data reflects observable characteristics of the national population and therefore offers a highly accurate depiction of foreign and domestic investors in Vietnam. Consequently, the conclusions we draw can be trusted and generalized to the underlying population.
There are currently 5,620 active MNCs in Vietnam, which includes 4,609 100% FDI, and 1,011 joint ventures (JVs). 6 By this metric, the PCI accounts for 20% of the entire population of foreign investors found in the country! We find that were established and licensed after the USBTA, although we cannot say for certain that the USBTA was the primary stimulant for their entry, because other important changes were also taking place in the Vietnam economy at the time.
<Figure 2 About Here>
Our Empirical Strategy
To address the problems discussed in measuring corruption above, the 2010 PCI survey instrument, exploits an approach known as the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT). Informally known as the LIST question (Couts and Jann 2009, Ahart and Sackett 2004) , the technique has been used widely by researchers across many disciplines to explore many different kinds of sensitive topics but has only recently started gaining popularity as a method for studying corruption. List questions are extremely easy to administer, as a respondent is simply presented with a list of activities and must only answer how many of the activities they engaged in. They are not obligated to admit to engaging in a sensitive activity in any way. As a result, the respondent can reveal critical information without fear. Couts and Jann (2009) have shown in a series of experimental trials that UCT out performs all other techniques at eliciting sensitive information and maintaining the comfort level of respondents. The trick to the UCT approach is that the sample of respondents is randomly divided into two groups that are equal on all observable characteristics. One group of respondents is provided with a list of relatively infrequent, but not impossible activities, which are not sensitive in any way. The second group, however, receives an additional item, randomly placed in the list. This additional item is the sensitive activity.
Below is the UCT question included in the 2010 PCI survey regarding bribery during business registration and
licensing. An important feature of the question is that it is highly targeted and context specific. All of the activities listed are well-known to businesses operating in Vietnam and would not be perceived as impossible or artificial, which might damage their confidence in the question. Other UCTs which employ highly abstract activities often fall prey to this problem.
Moreover, the UCTs in this survey were specifically designed to differentiate participation petty corruption from grand corruption.
UCT Question 1:
Please take a look at the following list of common activities that firms engage in to expedite the steps needed to receive their investment license/registration certificate. How many of the activities did you engage in when fulfilling any of the business registration activities listed previously?
1. Followed procedures for business license on website. 2. Hired a local consulting/law firm to obtain the license the firm for you.
Paid informal charge to expedite procedures (Only Available on Form B of the Survey)
4. Looked for a domestic partner who was already registered
The question was asked to representatives of domestic as well as foreign owned firms. Whether a firm received A or B was determined by random sampling, so the two groups of respondents are balanced on all important observable characteristics. Table 3 shows the results of individual t-tests for each covariate of interest (Column 3) and results from a Probit model which regresses treatment on all covariates at the same time (Column 4) to address imbalances caused by joint effects of the variables. On key firm characteristics and operational environments there are no statistically significant differences between treatment and control groups. Only firms with owners who previously operated a state-owned enterprise and foreign firms which used the one-stop-shop (OSS) registration procedures were more likely to fall within the treatment group. Imbalances across the two groups may indicate systematic non-response by firms receiving the treatment list. Table 3 however, shows that this is not the case. In fact, treatment groups in both the domestic and foreign samples exhibited higher rates of completion than the control group. As a result, we can safely interpret the differences between treatment and control groups as being determined entirely by the additional item in the list question and not by features of firms or provincial setting.
<Table 3 about Here>
Respondents are only asked to tell the interviewer how many of the listed items they have either engaged in or believe in, and are specifically instructed NOT to identify which items they specifically engaged in. Respondent anonymity is provided because neither the interviewer nor the researcher can interpret whether or not a treated respondent's answer included a sensitive item. One concern is that respondent's may feel trapped by the set of non-sensitive items. If the activities are too frequent, a respondent in treatment may feel forced to answer the maximum number of activities (including the sensitive item), thereby revealing their complicity directly. Alternatively, non-sensitive items that are too rare would have the opposite effect, allowing the respondent to believe that the sensitive item was the only reasonable option. In either case, the UCT would have failed and respondents would still be obligated to conceal their behavior. Our data did not appear to demonstrate such a tendency. Less than 15% of the respondents in the control group answered the maximum number of non-sensitive questions, and less than 2% answered zero items. 8 . In addition, pilot testing demonstrated low correlation between nonsensitive items. Such rare instances for extreme values and a lack of correlation between non-sensitive item responses, gives us great confidence that respondents were able to answer honestly
It is important to keep in mind that our survey question relies on the ability of the respondent to recall the activities they engaged during the last time they completed registration procedures, for some firms this took place over 15 years ago.
Although we could have chosen more proximate events for our survey experiment, the year a firm entered is critically important for our results, as we aim to take advantage of the changes in investment restrictions over time, paying special attention to the restrictions that were in place at the time a firm chose to enter the Vietnamese market. To mitigate, we chose 22 our activity items carefully, so that each represented an obvious action and was easy to remember. Nevertheless, such questions in firm-level surveys pose two dangers. First, data is likely to be noisier at early years of registration, which tends to reduce significance of results. Second, changes in firm management over time may mean that the respondent is different from the owner or manager who actually completed the procedures. 9 Indeed follow-up interviews with respondents revealed that some of the item non-response to the question comes from new managers unable to answer the question. Once again, this problem most likely will lead to noise and insignificant findings rather than biased coefficients.
Once a survey is completed, a simple difference-in-means test between the treatment and control groups can reveal a population proportion equal to the prevalence of the sensitive behavior or belief. These results are shown in Figure 3 .
Triangles depict the average number of activities that the treated group participates in, while diamonds illustrate the average activities of the control group. The range bars around the mean scores are 95% confidence intervals. The first thing to notice is that the range bars do not overlap in either the foreign or domestic cases, indicating the differences in means are statistically significant and therefore that the treatment was effective. To calculate the percentage, we must now only subtract the treatment average from the control average (1.879 and 1.652 respectively in the case of business registration for all investors).
These difference between these means is .229 (when rounded to the nearest thousandth), indicating that 22.9% of businesses pay bribes at registration.
Disaggregating by foreign and domestic operations, as we do in Figure 3 , reveals that foreign firms are slightly less likely to pay bribes than domestic firms overall (18% versus 21%), but the difference is not statistically significant. The disaggregated averages are lower than the overall average, because disaggregating and calculating separate means, removes the direct comparison between treated domestic firms and foreign control firms -a problem that we deal with below using a multiple regression estimation strategy.
<Figure 3 About Here>
Firm-Level Empirical Analysis
Although the difference-in-means interpretation provides a very powerful illustration of how prevalent corruption is, it is nevertheless a crude analysis that ignores a wealth of information within and outside the survey that may help differentiate between the types of firms or settings conducive to corruption and the factors that might reduce it. Using an ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis is possible but cumbersome, as it requires interacting each possible determinant of corruption with the treatment variable. This quickly leads to unwieldy models that are difficult to interpret.
We address this issue by adapting a two-stage non-linear least squares (NLS) estimation model developed by Imai (2011) which extends the difference in means approach used above to multivariate estimation. 10 This process allows for more complex evaluation and theory testing which makes use of the rich descriptive information available in the survey. The Imai process involves fitting a model to describe the control group, then using the estimated coefficients to predict new values for the treated group, and finally fitting the imputed values over the observed in the treated group through an expectationalgorithm to produce estimators for each variable included in the following model:
: response variable (total number of activities)
: treatment variable (received survey with sensitive item)
: matrix of covariates ( ) : model for non-sensitive items (
In the first stage of the adapted procedure, we fit the model to the control group via negative binomial estimation (to account for count-nature of the data and the over-dispersion caused by zero answers) and obtain , which is the relationship between participating in the non-sensitive behavior and each independent variable. In the second stage, we fit the model to treatment group via non-linear least squares (NLS), after subtracting from and obtain , the relationship between participating in the sensitive behavior and each independent variable. Because the dependent variable in the second stage is an estimate, standard errors are calculated using bootstrapping with 1,000 replications. When there are no covariates (independent variables) introduced in the model, the estimator reduces to the difference-in-means estimator. This can be seen in Model 1 of Table 4 , which replicates the difference-in-means estimator from above. Note that 10 Imai also develops a maximum likelihood estimator, which is more efficient, but we prefer the NLS estimation, because it is able to recover the difference-in-means estimate when no controls are added.
the constant is .229, indicating 22.9% of respondents engage in the activity. Also not that the number of observations (4,544) is about half of the true sample of firms, as the second stage is only performed on the treatment group. 11
One of the core assumptions required for implementing the Imai method is that there is a finite set of respondent types based on the number of non-sensitive choices within the experiment (the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption). This means that missing observations for the variable of interest (resulting in an undefined respondent type)
necessitates either list-wise deletion of the observation or imputation. Beyond the statistical demands, there is a theoretical reason to impute missing data. Missing responses to sensitive questions, such as the ones evaluated here, are unlikely to be missing completely at random. Respondents do not simply flip coins and choose not to answer specific queries; rather, respondents do not answer questions that they do not understand or ones that make them uncomfortable, fear retribution, or believe that their answers may not remain confidential. The factors behind these choices are likely to be correlated with other features of the respondents' backgrounds. As a result, dropping these non-responses leads to bias. In our case, respondents' attempts to hide culpability will likely lead to an under-estimation of the overall level of bribery.
To resolve this problem, we employ multiple imputation using the AMELIA software program (Honaker et al. 2001 ).
Multiple imputation allows us to predict the missing observations, using the observed information we possess from the answers of other respondents and the questions that all respondents answered. As the authors of AMELIA put it, "Multiple imputation involves imputing m values for each missing cell in your data matrix and creating m "completed" data sets. Across these completed data sets, the observed values are the same, but the missing values are filled in with a distribution of imputations that reflect the uncertainty about the missing data" (p3). Thus, if we learn that former state owned enterprises are statistically more likely to report corruption among the firms that answered our question, AMELIA will likely impute a higher probability of corruption among former state owned enterprises that did respond. Because we have predicted the corruption five times and created five datasets, our estimates will allow us to include the estimation of the uncertainty of the predicted values in our future analyses. AMELIA also has the benefit of being able to predict count variables, so that our dependent variable remains simply a count of how many activities a respondent engaged in. The imputed and aggregated dataset, (both domestic and foreign) includes 8,455 (7,300 domestic versus 1,155 foreign) observations for the question concerning 25 corruption during (registration/licensing). While our analysis primarily relies on the imputed data, we re-ran our core specifications to ensure that are results are not an artifact of the choice to impute. 12
Model Specification
Our first theoretical expectation is that bribery is likely to be higher when foreign firms seek to enter sectors that are designated as Group A projects. Thus, we expect that g, the predicted proportion of firm paying bribes is determined by the following equation, where C represents a matrix of control variables:
We begin our analysis in Model 2 of Table 4 by assessing the component effects of FDI and Restricted Sectors, whether an entry sector is restricted in the year a firm entered the Vietnamese market. 13 Model 3 then adds the interaction between FDI and restrictions. Omitted variable bias is a possibility, as particular types of firms may be both more likely to engage in more registration activities and be clustered in high-rent industries. This is particularly important for our comparison of foreign and domestic firms. While they are very similar within the same four-digit code, foreign firms do tend to be larger and more optimistic. To address this, we add a series of control variables for firm and provincial level characteristics in Model 4. Labor Size, a categorical variable illustrating the employment size of the firm at the time they applied for registration, ranges from 1-8, where 1 equals less than five employees and 8 equals greater than 1000. Capital Size, similarly, is an eight-point categorical variable representing the amount of registered capital for domestic firms or the operating license size for foreign firms at the time of entry (1: <$25,0000 to 8: >$25 million). Harstad and Svensson (2011) argue that large and important firms are less likely to bribe, as they can rely on lobbying to circumvent difficult regulations. About 6% of the domestic firms in the sample are formerly state-owned enterprises that have been privatized according to Vietnamese law.
Because shares of privatized firms are offered first to employees in the enterprise, Vietnamese authorities have termed this equitization. In many cases, these formally state owned firms have maintained the same directors and top managers and therefore have a far different relationship with bureaucrats, especially with local registration officers, than greenfield private investment. Finally, bribery may be a function of general optimism on the part of an entrepreneur, rather than the rents associated with a particular sector. Because we want to isolate the generalizable aspects of corruption, we control for firmlevel optimism, by including a variable called expand, which measures whether the business has plans to expand its production, investment, labor-force, or add to its product lines over the next two years. Model 5 adds a dummy variable for whether a province is considered to be one of Vietnam's five national-level cities (Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hai Phong, Da Nang, and Can Tho), which are urban centers that have the same political authority as provinces. These cities face unique problems of urbanization and are also granted special administrative and regulatory privileges. Model 6, the fully-specified model, adds a quadratic time trend to ensure that the relationship is not a function of trending in both corruption and restrictions over time.
Results
The results offer strong evidence for H1. In the fully-specified Model 6, when competing in non-restricted sectors,
MNCs are not significantly more likely than domestic firms to pay bribes during business entry. The coefficient on restricted sectors, however, is significant and negative, indicating that domestic firms in restricted sectors are actually about 8% less likely to pay bribes than domestic firms in non-restricted sectors. This result strongly indicates that Group A restrictions have a protectionist element (see Tanzi and Coelho 1993) , raising the costs for foreign firms to enter the market, while allowing domestic firms entry without extortion. Finally, the coefficient on the interactions is substantively large and highly significant (0.27). This means that, when all variables are held constant at their mean, foreign firms attempting to enter restricted sectors have a 31% predicted probability of engaging in bribery, 14% higher than their domestic competitors in restricted sectors and 19% more likely to bribe than foreign firms in non-restricted sectors.
These differences can be observed graphically in Figure 4 . In the first panel, we compare the difference in coefficients between foreign firms in restricted and non-restricted sectors. In the second panel, we compare coefficients between foreign and domestic firms within the same Group A categories. The results of Table 4 (Model 6) are shown by the first range bar in each panel. In both cases, the differences are significantly above zero (marked with a dashed lines), providing strong confirmation for our first hypothesis.
<Table 4 and Figure 4 about Here>
Looking at the control variables, we learn that, all else equal, large employers are less likely to pay bribes. A one unit shift in the eight-point scale, leads to a 3.5% reduction in bribery. Although we can only speculate, it may be that they are economically important and can lobby instead of bribe or because local gatekeepers may implicitly favor firms that can help create jobs for Vietnam's young labor force, which grows by about 1.5 million individuals annually. Highly capitalized firms, by contrast, are marginally more likely to pay a bribe. This provides further evidence for the role of investment restrictions, as all projects over $10 million before the 2000 amendment to the Foreign Investment Law and $40 million after are subject to the same additional licensing step as Group A sectors. It also contrasts the socio-political appeal of large-employers who reduce unemployment to that of large capital holders who have deeper pockets. Finally, a one-unit shift in optimism increases the chances of bribery by 4.8%, further demonstrating that firms with expectations of success are willing to pay more.
Robustness Tests
Imai's two-stage NLS estimator is a major empirical breakthrough, but other alternatives exist. To ensure that our results are not an artifact of modeling choices, we developed several sensitivity tests. First, Model 7 replaces the quadratic time trend with year fixed effects, knocking out all over-time variation and allowing us to simply compare restricted and unrestricted sectors within a given year. Model 8 addresses the fact that most business registration takes place at Departments of Planning and Investment (DPIs) located in Vietnam's 63 provinces. Because it is possible that corruption may be associated with specific provincial activities that are correlated with firm-level features, such as size or industry type, we add provincial fixed effects in Model 8 to ensure that our results survive a within-province comparison. Both of these fixed-effect estimators are calculated using ordinary least squares (OLS), because of the well-known biases associated with fixed effects in maximum-likelihood estimations. In both cases, the substantive effects of FDI, restrictions, and the interaction are nearly identical to the fully-specified Model 7.
Model 8 offers a truncated estimation of bribery in the second stage, where negative values in the dependent variable are rounded to zero. This test is necessary, because the Imai (2011) approach of subtracting the predicted number of predicted non-sensitive items (f), from each the total number of activities (g), for treatment firms can lead to a predicted number of activities for treatment firms that is less than zero (Glynn 2010) . That is, the number of non-sensitive activities for predicted firms is greater than the total number of activities (including bribery) that it actually reported. Clearly, this is nonsensical. On the other hand, as Glynn (2010) notes, the truncated estimator is positively biased. Without control variables, the estimated total bribery during registration using the truncated estimator is 38%, sixteen points higher than the difference-in-means estimator. Thus, the marginal effect of the core interaction term is significantly smaller, but this is simply a function of the biased truncation. Most importantly, we find that the truncated estimator delivers the same substantive conclusions; bribery for MNCs in restricted sectors is significantly higher than their domestic competitors and other MNCs.
Model 10 applies the algorithm piecewise estimator suggested as an alternative specification by Glynn (2010: 13) . In this approach, we run separate logit models predicting the probability of a firm answering a specific number of items (k) in both the control and treatment group. For instance, a model is run for the probability of a firm answering one item.
Afterwards, we calculate the curve formed by the differences in the probability estimations for treatment and control firms.
This process is repeated for all possible values in the question. Finally, the difference curves are added to form a final K curve, which summarizes the overall prediction of bribery for each observation. Standard errors are calculated through bootstrapping. Using this approach yields almost the exact results as for the core variables with two exceptions. Bribery by MNCs in non-restricted sectors appears to be 3% smaller and standard errors are uncomfortably small, leading to nearly universal statistical significance of the covariates.
Finally, Models 11 and 12 replicate the difference-in-means estimation and fully-specified model using non-imputed data. Here, once again, our overall substantive conclusions are confirmed. Without imputation, however, we appear to under-estimate the proportion of MNCs participating in bribery in non-restricted sectors. 14 Table 5 picks up the above analysis, but focuses on the over-time effect of reducing bribery in two ways. First in Models 1 through 3, we look at the difference in results by re-running our analysis before and after WTO admission. Model 1 includes the full set of firms which registered before WTO, while Model 2 compares only the first three years prior to WTO entry (2004) (2005) (2006) to eliminate firms which registered in the early years of the Vietnam's reform era and allow for a more balanced comparison. Next, in Model 4, we introduce four-digit ISIC fixed effects, so that we are only comparing firms within the most highly disaggregated sector. Controlling for all conceivable structural features that might differentiate firms in that sector, the measure of restrictions will pick-up the average effect of removing restrictions over-time. Ideally, we would compare the exact same firms over time using panel data, but the UCT questions were only asked in the most recent version of the survey. Models 5, 6, and 7 offer robustness tests, employing truncated, piecewise, and non-imputed estimations.
Hypothesis 2: The Impact of Removing Restrictions over Time
First in Models 1 through 3, we find that the key results discovered in Table 4 : a lower probability of bribery by FIEs in non-restricted sectors; and a higher probability of bribery in restricted sectors -are most pronounced before WTO 14 One concern with our analysis is our blunt treatment of foreign investors. Foreign firms differ in their country of origin, the legal form of their mode of entry into Vietnam, and whether they chose to avail themselves of special legal mechanisms meant to facilitate investment and reduce corruption, such as licensing within investment zones. If these features are correlated with the probability of investing in restricted sector, we could be confusing the effect of high rents with investor type. Although space considerations prohibit reporting the results, Online Appendix 4 disaggregates the results by investor type. Our findings confirm that bribe propensity increases for foreign investors in restricted sectors is not an artifact of a particular investor type or policy choice being correlated with restricted sectors. We find that firms from OECD countries are 3% less likely to bribe than other home countries in aggregate. This effect is entirely driven by reduced bribery in restricted sectors (-40%), as OECD origin actually has a slight positive effect in nonrestricted sectors.
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accession. As Figure 4 shows, the predicted probability of bribery for foreign firms was 37% in restricted sectors before WTO entry, 29% in the years in the years just before WTO entry, and only 13% afterwards. In the years after WTO entry (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) , the impact of domestic treatment for MNCs seems to have led to a convergence between domestic and foreign firms.
This can be seen clearly by the lack of significant differences in the fourth range bar of Figure 4 . The coefficients retain the same signs, but the magnitude of the effects is much smaller and not significantly different from zero.
For H2, the effect of the WTO is troubling, as it appears that WTO accession influenced bribery in ways beyond simply the removal of restricted sectors. After all, the bribery within the sectors that remain restricted declined as well, which is not what our theory anticipated. The most likely explanation is that bribery from previous time periods increased entry into those sectors and reduced the rents available in restricted sectors. The WTO results do not offer a clear-cut finding on the effect of removing restrictions. Although intriguing, we should be cautious about these conclusions, as the choice to enter WTO was not exogenous and cannot be separated satisfactorily from domestic reforms taking place in the economy during the exact same time period.
To address H2 more directly, we turn to a fixed effects analysis in Model 4, where we study the removal of restrictions within a particular four-digit ISIC code. Here, we find significant support for H2 -removing restrictions does have a significant impact on the propensity of MNCs to pay bribes. In years where a product or service faced restrictions, MNCs were more likely to pay bribes. The 0.125 coefficient indicates that foreign firms facing Group A restrictions pay 12.5% more than firms in the same sector after those restrictions were lifted. Since the only variation in Group A restrictions is longitudinal and because restrictions are always removed but never newly created, we can interpret the inverse of the coefficient (-0.125) as the effect of removing restrictions. Interestingly, reducing the protections for domestic firms had the opposite effect. The rate of bribery among domestic firms, now suddenly subject to increased foreign competition, actually increased by an average of 14.7%. This may explain why the Vietnamese analysts, who primarily cite domestic incidents, have observed an uptick in corruption. While reforms have changed the way foreign firms gain access to the Vietnamese market they have not changed local bureaucrats who depend on bribe extortions. As in other countries, like China, that bias policy to the benefit of foreign investment (Huang 2008) , emerging domestic entrepreneurs may in fact be becoming more attractive targets for extortion.
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In short, the results of Table 5 offer mixed conclusions for Hypothesis 2. While opening up to foreign competition does reduce the propensity for MNCs to bribe, it compels their domestic competitors within the same sectors to increase their potential to bribe. Certainly more research is necessary to understand this unanticipated finding.
<Table 5 About Here>
Concluding thoughts on FDI and Corruption
In this paper, we have sought to enhance the literature linking foreign capital flows to changes in corruption by addressing the major methodological shortcoming in the literature: measurement error in corruption, which is significantly correlated with the independent variables under investigation. We suggest that previous findings linking openness to less corruption are hard to interpret, as the merits often attributed to openness may simply result from the fact that FDI and trade are attracted to the same types of institutions that produce lower levels of perceived corruption. Using the UCT technique, we present the first empirical findings of this relationship that are divorced of such spurious correlation. In addition, our empirical design employs both foreign and domestic firms to address whether openness has an independent effect on corruption or simply adjusts to local norms and bribe schedules. We find over the entire period of investigation 22.9% of operations in Vietnam pay bribes during the registration period, and that corruption appears to have declined over time in general, as those hypothesizing positive effects of foreign capital inflows on corruption might expect. Our within-country firm level design allows us to eliminate socio-cultural factors and institutional differences as the source of corruption, as these factors did not vary dramatically over the period and changed very little upon Vietnam's WTO accession. Our focus on actual firm behavior further removes the possibility that results are derived from inaccurate perceptions. Consequently, this study demonstrates in a limited way that corruption is a nuanced activity that, like other business activities, is a two-way street where behavior is dictated by the expected gains from the activity for both parties. It is not simply an additional tax on doing business. Understanding this feature can help us devise more targeted policy interventions for reducing corruption in Vietnam and other emerging markets. We contribute to this discussion by using a dynamic measure of competition which is specifically associated with entry into a market rather than a subjective measure sensitive to all sorts and stages of malfeasance. By doing so, we offer a more complete account of how changes in the market influence corrupt activities. Similarly, by focusing on market entry we can make more confident conclusions about how competition affects the corruption rate among new entrants, such as foreign invested enterprises. Most importantly, we Table 1 Note: Diamonds represent the mean score for the control group, triangles depict the mean score for the treatment group, and range bars depict confidence intervals. The difference-in-means in a list question depicts the proportion of respondents engaging in the sensitive activity. (Table  5 , Model 2), so that the time period studied is comparable to the three years after WTO entry shown by the "Post-WTO" range bar (Table 5 , Model 3). The figure demonstrates that foreign firms in restricted sectors are significantly more lilely to bribe than their non-restricted foreign counterparts and domestic firms in the same sectors. Nevertheless, this tendency has declined since 2007. 
